Addis Ababa, October 9, 2026 (FMC) — There are political forces whose greatest tragedy is not merely the damage they inflict on a country, but the suffering they bring upon the very people whose name they invoke.
The illegal TPLF has become a symbol of this destructive contradiction: a political force whose struggle to reclaim power threatens to plunge the people of the Tigray region back into the very cycle of conflict, loss and uncertainty from which they desperately need to escape.
For the people of the Tigray region, the cost of this politics is measured not in slogans, declarations or claims of political legitimacy, but in lives disrupted, futures postponed, communities left vulnerable and the painstaking work of reconstruction placed at risk.
After the devastation of the 2020–2022 war and the promise of the Pretoria Agreement, peace should have opened a path toward recovery, reconciliation and a dignified future. Instead, renewed confrontation has once again placed that future in jeopardy.
A political faction cannot claim to defend a people while exposing them to another cycle of destruction. No party owns the identity, aspirations or destiny of the people it claims to represent. Their future is larger than the survival of any political leadership, and their dignity cannot be held hostage to a struggle for lost power.
The people of the Tigray region deserve schools that educate rather than institutions emptied by conflict, livelihoods that sustain families rather than an economy crippled by insecurity, and a political future shaped by their choices rather than the calculations of armed factions.
The danger extends beyond the region. Ethiopia cannot accelerate its transformation while recurrent confrontation threatens national stability, drains resources from development and deepens divisions among its communities.
Peace is not a concession to political opponents; it is the foundation on which national prosperity is built. Every escalation diverts attention and resources from agriculture, industry, infrastructure, education and the creation of opportunities for a generation that deserves to inherit more than the consequences of its predecessors’ conflicts.
The formation of an alliance between the TPLF and other armed opposition groups makes this danger more acute. Bringing disparate movements together around a common objective of removing the federal government does not, by itself, establish a shared vision for Ethiopia’s future. Where groups have different constituencies, histories and political ambitions, their convergence raises fundamental questions:
What political order would follow confrontation? What safeguards would protect civilians? What guarantees would prevent another round of fragmentation? And who would bear responsibility if the country were pushed into a wider conflict?
These are not peripheral questions. They go to the heart of whether political opposition is being pursued through a credible vision for the country or through an alignment whose immediate objective risks eclipsing the consequences for ordinary Ethiopians.
Ethiopia needs political competition that expands the space for peaceful participation, not a contest that turns armed pressure into a substitute for public consent.
The regional implications are equally grave. The Horn of Africa is too strategically important, too economically interconnected and too burdened by conflict to withstand another prolonged confrontation in Ethiopia.
Instability in the country can reverberate across borders, disrupt trade and transport, intensify displacement and create openings for rival powers to pursue their interests through the weaknesses of others.
A crisis that begins as an internal political struggle can become a regional security problem with consequences far beyond its original front lines.
Asmara’s relationship with Ethiopia has entered another dangerous phase. The Ethiopian government has accused Eritrea of military aggression and of supporting armed opponents inside Ethiopia; Eritrea rejects the accusations and advances its own claims about Ethiopian intentions.
Whatever the competing official narratives, the risk is unmistakable: renewed confrontation between the two neighbours could turn an already fragile political environment into a much wider regional crisis. The people of the Tigray region must not become the human terrain on which a contest between governments is fought.
Cairo, too, occupies a consequential place in the region’s strategic calculations. Its long-running dispute with Ethiopia over the Abbay and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, alongside its expanding security diplomacy in the Horn of Africa, has contributed to a climate of mistrust. Ethiopian officials have also accused Egypt of supporting forces seeking to destabilize the country, an accusation Cairo denies.
These competing positions make restraint, transparency and respect for sovereignty all the more important. No regional power should see Ethiopia’s internal fractures as an opportunity to weaken its development, constrain its strategic choices or shape its future through pressure.
The central danger is the convergence of internal fragmentation with external rivalry. A faction consumed by the pursuit of power can create openings that others exploit for entirely different purposes.
The interests of the people of the Tigray region, the political ambitions of the TPLF, the security calculations of Asmara and the regional strategy of Cairo are not interchangeable. Yet when confrontation deepens, it is ordinary people who risk paying for calculations made far beyond their control.
That is why the TPLF must be judged not by the grandeur of its rhetoric, but by the consequences of its actions. Political history cannot grant permanent ownership of a region, and former power cannot confer an unlimited right to dictate the country’s future.
The people of the Tigray region are entitled to political representation, security, recovery and a future free from perpetual mobilization. Those rights cannot be secured by dragging them back toward war.
The choice before Ethiopia is larger than the fortunes of one party or the ambitions of any regional government. It is a choice between allowing political grievances to feed another cycle of destruction and building a durable settlement in which disputes are addressed without sacrificing civilian lives or national stability. It is a choice between a Horn of Africa trapped in rivalries and a region capable of turning its strategic position into shared prosperity.
The TPLF’s political leadership must confront the consequences of a course that places renewed confrontation above the urgent needs of the people it claims to represent. Asmara must not turn its disputes with Ethiopia into a pathway toward wider conflict.
Cairo must not allow its rivalry with Addis Ababa to deepen regional insecurity. And Ethiopia’s internal political divisions must not become an invitation for external powers to determine the country’s destiny.
The people of the Tigray region are not expendable instruments of political survival. Ethiopia’s peace is not a bargaining chip in regional rivalries. And the Horn of Africa cannot afford to let another generation inherit the wreckage of ambitions pursued without regard for human cost.
A curse on Ethiopia is a tragedy for the people of the Tigray region and a canker eating at the Horn of Africa whenever political ambition, armed confrontation and regional rivalry combine to consume the prospects of peace.
The way forward must be built around the people, protected by respect for sovereignty and sustained by a political settlement that places human lives and the future of the region above the survival of any faction.