Addis Ababa, September 22, 2026 (FMC) — Egypt’s latest remarks on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) have once again brought an old question to the fore: whether Ethiopia’s sovereign development choices are to be judged by arrangements made without its participation, or by the principles of equality, equitable use and mutual respect that should govern relations among countries sharing the Abbay basin.
Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Hani Sewilam recently described the GERD as “illegitimate” and said Egypt retained the right to take measures it considers necessary to protect its water security. He also argued that Ethiopian officials should distinguish between building within national territory and constructing a dam on what he described as an international river.
For Ethiopia, however, the argument goes beyond one dam or one round of statements. It touches the fundamental question of whether a sovereign African country can develop the water and other natural resources within its territory for the benefit of its people without having to obtain permission from a downstream state.
The Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy has rejected such a premise, describing the latest remarks as deeply regrettable and as reflecting what it called a “crude colonial mentality.” The Ministry has also pointed to what it considers a double standard in the debate: Egypt’s construction of the Aswan High Dam proceeded without consultation with upstream riparian states, while Cairo now insists that Ethiopia’s development of its own water resources must be subject to arrangements acceptable to Egypt.
At the heart of the dispute is therefore not simply water, but the legacy of a regional order in which Ethiopia was not a party to the principal agreements invoked by Egypt and Sudan to support their historical water allocations.
The 1929 Anglo-Egyptian arrangement granted Egypt and Sudan allocations of 48 billion and 4 billion cubic metres respectively and included provisions concerning projects that could affect the flow of the river. The 1959 Egypt-Sudan agreement subsequently allocated 55.5 billion cubic metres to Egypt and 18.5 billion cubic metres to Sudan. Ethiopia was not a signatory to either agreement.
That history remains central to Ethiopia’s objection to any attempt to transform those bilateral arrangements into a binding framework for the entire basin. For Addis Ababa, an agreement between two downstream countries cannot by itself extinguish the rights of an upstream sovereign state or determine the limits of its development.
The GERD has made that principle concrete. Built on the Abbay, the project represents Ethiopia’s effort to turn one of its most significant natural resources into electricity and broader economic opportunity. Its completion and inauguration in 2025 have also fundamentally changed the physical reality of the dispute: the dam is no longer a proposed project awaiting permission, but an operating national infrastructure project.
Yet the character of the project matters. GERD is principally a hydropower facility. Water released through its turbines continues downstream rather than being permanently consumed. The project can therefore generate electricity from the movement of water while allowing the resource to continue toward downstream countries.
Ethiopia’s broader position has consistently rested on the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization, the obligation not to cause significant harm to other riparian states, and cooperation among basin countries. Those principles do not establish a hierarchy in which downstream geography automatically creates superior rights over upstream development.
The same principle applies beyond the GERD. Ethiopia possesses extensive water, energy, agricultural and other natural resources within its sovereign territory. Its development challenge is precisely to convert those resources into electricity, productive capacity, industrialization, food security and improved living standards for a population of more than 100 million.
The Abbay is particularly important in that national development equation. For decades, Ethiopia’s abundant water resources coexisted with severe electricity shortages and limited industrial capacity. The GERD emerged from that contradiction: a country endowed with substantial hydropower potential seeking to use its own resources to expand access to energy and accelerate development.
The argument that Ethiopia should simply preserve that potential for downstream use cannot reasonably be separated from the development rights of the upstream population. Nor can historical claims be treated as though they were immutable laws of nature.
Egypt’s water-security concerns are real and widely documented. Egyptian officials emphasize the country’s heavy dependence on the river and have repeatedly called for a legally binding agreement governing GERD operations. Ethiopia, meanwhile, maintains that its development cannot be placed under a framework that effectively requires Egyptian approval for projects undertaken within Ethiopian territory.
These positions need not lead to permanent confrontation. The fundamental choice for the basin is whether historical grievances and competing claims will continue to define relations, or whether the countries can build a framework in which development, water security, energy generation and regional integration reinforce one another.
For Ethiopia, the answer begins with sovereignty. The country’s right to develop its resources cannot be measured by an inherited scale designed in another era, nor can its development aspirations be confined by agreements to which it was not a party.
The Abbay is part of Ethiopia’s natural inheritance and a foundation of its development ambitions. Its waters can support Ethiopian development while continuing downstream. Its resources can generate electricity, industry and prosperity while cooperation remains possible across the basin.
The challenge, ultimately, is not to determine which country owns a river, but to establish whether countries sharing a basin can recognize one another as sovereign equals.
No Pharaoh’s scale can measure Ethiopia’s right to the Abbay — or to the resources within its sovereign territory. That right is rooted not in ancient privilege, but in sovereignty, equitable use, development and the principle that Africa’s future should be shaped by cooperation among equals rather than inherited hierarchies.