𝐄𝐓𝐇𝐈𝐎𝐏𝐈𝐀’𝐒 𝐀𝐁𝐀𝐘 𝐀𝐍𝐃 𝐑𝐄𝐃 𝐒𝐄𝐀 𝐈𝐍𝐓𝐄𝐑𝐄𝐒𝐓𝐒: 𝐍𝐎 𝐌𝐎𝐑𝐄 𝐓𝐀𝐁𝐎𝐎𝐒, 𝐍𝐎 𝐑𝐄𝐓𝐑𝐄𝐀𝐓—𝐎𝐍𝐋𝐘 𝐋𝐀𝐖, 𝐂𝐎𝐎𝐏𝐄𝐑𝐀𝐓𝐈𝐎𝐍 𝐀𝐍𝐃 𝐌𝐔𝐓𝐔𝐀𝐋 𝐁𝐄𝐍𝐄𝐅𝐈𝐓

Addis Ababa, October 27, 2026 (FMC) — For too long, Ethiopia’s vital interests in the Abay River and the Red Sea have occupied a sensitive place in regional geopolitics, often discussed through the anxieties of neighbouring states rather than through the legitimate development needs and strategic concerns of Ethiopia itself.

That era of treating Ethiopia’s interests as subjects too dangerous to raise must give way to a more candid and constructive regional conversation. The country’s future cannot be secured by silence, and its national interests cannot be permanently confined by geopolitical pressure.

The message delivered by Ethiopian National Defense Force Chief of Staff Field Marshal Berhanu Jula during the 119th Defense Forces Day on October 25 was unmistakable: Ethiopia cannot abandon interests it considers essential to its future simply because their articulation unsettles others.

He placed the Abay River and the Red Sea within a broader national imperative to safeguard Ethiopia’s sovereignty, development prospects and the well-being of generations to come. At the same time, he stressed that relations with neighbouring countries should rest on brotherhood and good-neighbourly cooperation—not on Ethiopia being expected to surrender its interests.

This is the geopolitical question Ethiopia must now confront openly: How can the Horn of Africa move beyond a politics of suspicion and strategic obstruction towards an order in which national interests are addressed through international law, negotiation, regional cooperation and arrangements that deliver mutual benefits?

The answer begins by distinguishing the assertion of a national interest from an attempt to deny another country its rights.

Ethiopia has a legitimate interest in using the Abay, known internationally as the Blue Nile, to advance its development, expand electricity generation, support agriculture and improve the living standards of its population.

Downstream countries have legitimate interests in water security and predictable management of a shared river system. These interests need not be treated as inherently incompatible. The challenge is to establish practical arrangements that recognise the rights and needs of all the countries concerned.

International water law offers a framework for addressing precisely this challenge. The 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses identifies equitable and reasonable utilization, participation and cooperation as central principles.

It also requires consideration of relevant geographical, hydrological, social and economic factors, including the needs of populations dependent on the watercourse. These principles provide a basis for negotiation—not a justification for freezing the development aspirations of one riparian country in order to preserve the advantages enjoyed by another.

For Ethiopia, the implications are profound. The country should not have to choose between pursuing its development and maintaining peaceful relations with its neighbours. Nor should downstream concerns be dismissed.

A sustainable regional arrangement must recognise both Ethiopia’s right to equitable and reasonable utilization and the obligation of the countries sharing the basin to cooperate in protecting the watercourse and addressing potential harm.

The 2015 Declaration of Principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, signed by Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan, itself identifies cooperation, equitable and reasonable utilization, the avoidance of significant harm and peaceful settlement of disputes among its guiding principles.

The challenge is to translate such commitments into a durable culture of cooperation, with practical solutions grounded in good faith rather than recurring political confrontation.

Egypt occupies a central place in this debate. Its longstanding concerns over the Nile’s waters have repeatedly brought it into disagreement with Ethiopia over development, water use and the future management of the basin.

These differences cannot be resolved by treating Ethiopia’s development ambitions as an existential threat or by expecting Ethiopia to refrain indefinitely from using resources that are fundamental to its own population.

Equally, Ethiopia’s legitimate interests do not require the denial of Egypt’s interests. The way forward is not to replace one country’s perceived monopoly with another’s, but to establish a regional understanding that recognises the interdependence of the Nile Basin.

A river that crosses national boundaries demands cooperation across those boundaries. Political pressure, rigid historical claims and confrontational rhetoric cannot substitute for arrangements that are equitable, sustainable and responsive to the needs of the people who depend on its waters.

The wider lesson concerns the kind of regional order that the Horn of Africa will build. If the countries of the region continue to approach shared resources through zero-sum calculations, each development project will become another source of suspicion, and each diplomatic disagreement another opportunity for political mobilisation.

If they instead pursue transparent negotiations, information-sharing, joint development and mutually beneficial arrangements, the same resources can become foundations for economic integration and regional stability.

The Red Sea presents a different but equally important question. For Ethiopia, the loss of direct access to the sea in 1993 transformed maritime access into a strategic concern with lasting consequences for trade, transport costs, supply chains and economic competitiveness.

As a large, landlocked country, Ethiopia has compelling reasons to pursue reliable and affordable access to maritime trade. Its growing economy and its long-term development needs make the question too important to be treated as an issue that can simply be set aside.

But the legal distinction matters. Ethiopia’s strategic interest in the Red Sea does not, by itself, establish sovereign ownership over the sea or confer an automatic right to another country’s coastline or ports.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea recognises the right of landlocked states to access the sea and provides for freedom of transit, while specifying that the terms and modalities of transit are to be agreed with the relevant transit states through bilateral, subregional or regional arrangements. It also recognises the legitimate interests and sovereignty of transit states.

That framework strengthens the case for negotiation rather than weakening it. Ethiopia’s landlocked status should not be used as a reason to dismiss its maritime access needs. Nor should those needs be advanced through coercion or disregard for the sovereignty of coastal states.

The task is to negotiate dependable, mutually advantageous arrangements that serve Ethiopia’s economic requirements while respecting the rights of its neighbours.

Such cooperation could offer benefits well beyond port access. Improved maritime connectivity can support trade, investment, logistics, infrastructure development and cross-border economic activity. Agreements that provide reliable access while generating legitimate returns for coastal and transit states can create shared interests in stability.

Properly negotiated, maritime cooperation can become a source of regional opportunity rather than a recurring flashpoint.

This is where the distinction between legitimate geopolitical competition and a politics of conspiracy becomes essential. Ethiopia should not assume that every disagreement with a neighbouring state constitutes a coordinated plot, just as other countries should not interpret every Ethiopian assertion of national interest as a hostile act.

Specific allegations of interference or covert activity must be examined against evidence. Yet the broader principle is clear: no country should seek to advance its strategic position by undermining another country’s security, obstructing its legitimate development or mobilising regional tensions against it.

The region needs a political culture in which disagreements are addressed openly and transparently. Where interests conflict, states should negotiate. Where legal questions arise, they should engage the applicable international frameworks.

Where shared resources create interdependence, they should develop cooperative mechanisms. Where mistrust has accumulated, they should pursue confidence-building measures and practical agreements. This is not naïve idealism; it is the work required to turn geography from a source of recurring tension into an asset for regional prosperity.

For Ethiopia, the essential change is that raising the Abay and Red Sea questions should no longer be treated as a taboo. A country of Ethiopia’s population, economic ambitions and strategic importance has reason to discuss its water and maritime interests openly, explain them through international law and pursue them through sustained diplomacy.

Silence cannot resolve disputes, and postponing difficult questions indefinitely does not make them disappear.

But a more assertive national conversation must also be a more disciplined one. Ethiopia’s position will be stronger when it rests on clear legal arguments, carefully defined objectives, credible proposals and a willingness to negotiate practical outcomes.

A durable settlement is not secured by declarations alone. It requires diplomatic consistency, technical engagement, regional dialogue and agreements that can withstand changes in political leadership.

Field Marshal Berhanu’s remarks therefore point to a larger strategic choice. Ethiopia can defend its interests while pursuing peaceful relations with its neighbours. It can reject the idea that its national priorities must remain unspoken without rejecting cooperation.

And it can insist that regional stability must be built on mutual respect rather than on expectations that one country alone should bear the cost of maintaining another’s strategic comfort.

The Abay and the Red Sea are different in their geography and legal status, but they converge in one respect: both raise questions about Ethiopia’s long-term development and its place in the region. One demands equitable and reasonable cooperation among countries sharing a transboundary watercourse; the other requires negotiated maritime access that respects the sovereignty of coastal states and the rights of landlocked countries.

Neither question should be settled through intimidation, geopolitical manoeuvring or attempts to isolate Ethiopia. Nor can either be resolved by substituting slogans for law. The way forward is a regional compact built on international law, good-neighbourly relations, transparent negotiations and arrangements that create tangible benefits for all parties.

Ethiopia’s national interests are no longer questions to be buried beneath regional sensitivities. They are questions to be addressed openly, lawfully and constructively. There should be no return to silence, no presumption that legitimate interests must be surrendered to avoid controversy, and no acceptance of confrontation as the region’s permanent political language.

The choice before the Horn of Africa is whether to allow suspicion to dictate its future—or to build a cooperative regional order in which Ethiopia and its neighbours can pursue their interests without denying one another the right to prosper.